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The impact of colonialism on Aboriginal groups in Canada is often described as
‘‘cultural genocide’’ or ‘‘ethnocide.’’ In contrast, this article offers a re-reading of the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (1948) that is sensitive to Aboriginal understandings and experiences
of group life and group destruction. Through this re-reading, it is argued that
genocide must be understood in a culturally contextualized manner so as to avoid
modernist and Eurocentric biases. Only by opening up the conception of genocide
will we be able to contend adequately with Canadian Aboriginal experiences of
colonialism.
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Introduction
The terms ‘‘cultural genocide’’ and ‘‘ethnocide’’ have often been used to describe the
destruction perpetrated against Canadian Aboriginal peoples.2 In such cases, one
senses that these terms are not intended to invoke one of the categories of genocide
created by Raphael Lemkin when the United Nations Secretariat retained him in 1946
to help draft an international convention3 but, rather, are used as qualifiers to describe
processes different from and less severe than genocide proper, which some suggest
must involve the attempted physical annihilation of the targeted group.4 However,
to characterize the harms produced by Canadian colonialism as cultural genocide is
problematic on at least three grounds. First, the varied path of attempted Aboriginal
destruction in Canada is misrepresented by attempts to reduce Canadian colonialism
to a singular event and Aboriginal Canadians to a single ‘‘group.’’ To put it simply,
Canadian Aboriginal peoples are culturally and regionally diverse and experienced
colonialism in different ways. Second, while all Aboriginal groups experienced at least
some degree of attempted assimilation, some also experienced high levels of physical
destruction through settler violence, disease, and deadly residential-school conditions,
as well as biological interference with reproductive processes. Finally, the separation
between ‘‘cultural’’ and ‘‘physical’’ forms of destruction—a modernist contrivance that
contends that such neat categories in fact exist—collapses under a more detailed
investigation of Aboriginal experiences of destruction. This third problematic is the
primary focus of this article.
While the assumption that Canadian Aboriginal peoples experienced only cultural
genocide is commonplace, in my research on land claims and reparations for Aboriginal
peoples in British Columbia, I have come across many Aboriginal persons who describe
their experiences of colonialism as ‘‘genocide.’’5 At first, I took this to be a politicized
use of the term—an attempt to harness its symbolic power to the task of advancing
Canadian Aboriginal justice claims.6 Surely they meant cultural genocide or ethnocide.
Moreover, in delineating their experiences of genocide, these Aboriginal respondents
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included not only residential schools and Canadian assimilation policies—phenomena
often discussed under the rubric of cultural genocide—but also land appropriation, the
spread of European diseases, and the broad legal framework of Canadian colonialism.
Taking these claims seriously, I begin in this article from the premise that these people
are neither strategically misinterpreting the term ‘‘genocide’’ nor employing it solely
for political purposes. In doing so, I argue that a re-reading of the 1948 United Nations
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNCG) through a lens
sensitive to Aboriginal realities lends greater validity to these claims.
If we are to begin to address Canadian Aboriginal claims of genocide, it is
necessary to reject a strictly epistemological approach to the question of genocide,
one that seeks to identify a guiding legal or sociological definition of genocide that can
be applied to multiple cases in a doctrinal manner. This means that the UNGC
definition of genocide will not be used here as a ‘‘universal grid’’7 for classifying human
groups and their violent relations. Lost within such generalizations are local
understandings of collective life and collective destruction. Thus, this article moves
toward an ‘‘ontology of destruction,’’ examining genocide from the perspective of how
destruction is experienced and made sense of by targeted collectivities who define their
worlds within culturally specific meaning systems. This portrayal will be partial, since
it is impossible to do more than hint at some Aboriginal understandings of destruction
within the allotted space. Thus, the examples provided are not intended as a
comprehensive account of Canadian Aboriginal genocides but are merely illustrative
of how the UNCG potentially fails to capture Canadian Aboriginal notions of being.
It should also be noted that my project is not to relativize or to broaden the concept
of genocide to the extent that it loses all meaning. Instead, the UNCG will continue to
serve as a guiding framework for constituting acts of genocide, but key components of
its definition will be interrogated and opened up so that they move beyond modernist
and Eurocentric meaning horizons. The goal is to employ the UNCG in a manner more
sensitive to cultural specificity, rather than in a strictly legalistic sense. To this end,
I will seek to destabilize what it means to be a ‘‘group,’’ to show ‘‘intent,’’ and to
experience ‘‘destruction,’’ all terms specified in art. 2 of the UNCG.8
Aboriginal/Non-Aboriginal Relations in Canada
Before embarking on this analysis it is necessary to provide a succinct summary of the
history of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations in Canada. The narrative that follows is a
simplification of the process of colonization, which, asmentioned above, took a variety of
distinct forms depending on the Aboriginal people and the region in question.
The first non-Aboriginal visitors to what is now Canada were Norsemen who
attempted to settle parts of Newfoundland and Labrador in the eleventh century.
Conflict ensued with the local Aboriginal population, and the Norse abandoned their
efforts. In the latter part of the fifteenth century, Europeans returned, this time
pursuing sea products ranging from cod to whale. Some expeditions set up temporary
camps ashore to dry their catch, but, for the most part, they had minimal contact with
Aboriginal peoples of this region.
Beginning in the sixteenth century, Europeans—in particular, the French and the
British—set out more regularly to explore North America. At first they sought to
discover a sea route to the riches of the Far East. But they soon discovered that North
America possessed its own store of wealth: the beaver pelts and other animal furs that
were desired in Europe. European traders depended on Aboriginal peoples to hunt
and treat the furs so that they could be transformed into hats and other clothing.
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This trade continued through much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
creating a symbiotic relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal trappers and
traders.
Aboriginal peoples were also important military allies for the competing European
colonizers. Warfare between Aboriginal peoples prior to the arrival of Europeans
tended to produce few casualties, since the available weaponry was relatively
unsophisticated. However, with the arrival of European military technology and
the export of European struggles to North American soil, Aboriginal peoples
found themselves increasingly engaged in deadly combat. The eighteenth century
was particularly bloody as the French, British, and Anglo-Americans battled for
control of North America. Many Aboriginal peoples found themselves immersed
in war, whether as part of an alliance with one of the conflicting European nations or
in combat with a new or long-standing Aboriginal enemy.
The French brought evangelism to their Aboriginal trading partners in the
seventeenth century. These efforts to ‘‘save’’ the ‘‘souls’’ of Aboriginal peoples were
intensified by religious orders such as the Re´collets and the Jesuits who ventured into
Aboriginal communities to proselytize to their inhabitants. These orders differed in
the degree to which they sought to assimilate Aboriginal peoples to European ways.
The Re´collets attempted not just a spiritual but a cultural conversion, while the Jesuits
believed that tending to the souls of Aboriginal peoples was enough. However, the
presence of these and other evangelists within Aboriginal communities, not to mention
the schools and churches they established, would, in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, be used by the Canadian government in its attempts to culturally absorb
Aboriginal persons into the Canadian mainstream (e.g., through ‘‘residential schools’’).
Despite the early presence of European traders and missionaries, settlers were few
at the onset of Canadian colonization. Indeed, Aboriginal peoples would have been in a
secure position to maintain their power, territories, traditions, and trade had it not
been for the spread of European diseases. Since Aboriginal peoples had established
little resistance to diseases such as smallpox, these diseases provided ‘‘biological
power’’ to facilitate European control.9 Carried along trade routes, diseases often
preceded Europeans into Aboriginal communities and decimated their populations.
At least half the Aboriginal population of between 200,000 and 300,000 people was
killed by disease between the beginning of the seventeenth century and the end of the
nineteenth.10 This devastating death toll opened vast areas of land to European
settlement and exploitation.
The destructive effect of colonialism intensified as Europeans began to seek
possession of Aboriginal territories for settlement and resource exploitation. Once
British control of Canada was established in the mid-seventeenth century, population
pressures and land scarcity in Britain brought settlers seeking new economic
opportunities to eastern Canada (and later to the Prairie region). In contrast, on the
West Coast of Canada, various entrepreneurs spearheaded colonial control of what is
today British Columbia when they strove to exploit the resources of this region.
Colonial economic activities on the West Coast began with the fur trade but expanded
into gold mining, fisheries, and forestry. Both settler and entrepreneurial patterns
of colonization affected Aboriginal peoples drastically, carving their traditional
territories into increasingly smaller allotments.
Any attempt by these newcomers to dispossess Aboriginal peoples of their lands
was supposed to be constrained by British law. In the aftermath of the Anglo–French
struggle for control of what is now Canada, George III of Britain issued the
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Royal Proclamation of 1763 to set the ground rules for colonial relations. The portion of
this text that refers to Aboriginal peoples reads as follows:
We do therefore, with the Advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal Will
and Pleasure . . . that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our other Colonies
or Plantations in America do presume for the present, and until our further Pleasure be
known, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any Lands beyond the Heads or
Sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West and North
West, or upon any Lands whatever, which, not having been ceded to or purchased by
Us as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.11
In accordance with this proclamation, the colonial government was charged with
signing treaties with Aboriginal peoples through which the latter would exchange
their territorial rights for goods and services to be provided by the Crown. This policy
was followed in several parts of Canada, leading to the creation of agreements such as
the ‘‘numbered treaties,’’ which cover large portions of Ontario and the Prairie
provinces. Negotiating in the afterglow of the cooperation and trust that defined
the fur trade, Aboriginal groups often assumed the treaties to be living documents that
would shift depending upon their changing needs. In contrast, the non-Aboriginal
negotiators saw the treaties as an opportunity to restrict Aboriginal peoples to reserves
and to gain access to their traditional territories through annuity payments.12
In other regions, this legal imperative to negotiate treaties was ignored. In British
Columbia, for example, Aboriginal peoples were denied treaties and forced onto
reserves smaller than those anywhere else in Canada. To this day, First Nations in
British Columbia seek treaty agreements that will recognize their Aboriginal rights
and title, as well as their inherent right to self-government.13
Although Canadian Aboriginal peoples have at times used laws such as the
Royal Proclamation to pursue their Aboriginal rights and title, law has more often
operated as a tool of colonization. Under British control, legal mechanisms such as the
1857 Gradual Civilization Act were passed to legislate the ‘‘progress’’ of Aboriginal
peoples. Following Confederation in 1867, the Dominion of Canada increased its use of
law as a means to control Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, a first step in this control was to
define the population that was to be controlled. In 1876, the Indian Act officially
codified the definition of Indian and non-Indian.14 This piece of legislation, despite
many revisions, is still in place and still regulates most dimensions of the lives of
First Nations individuals and communities.15 In addition, traditional Aboriginal
government structures were reshaped through laws such as the Indian Act and the
Enfranchisement Act of 1869, which combined to give the Canadian government
greater powers to interfere with governance on Aboriginal reserves.
It should also be noted that the spread of Canadian policing to the far corners of
the new nation had a marked impact on Aboriginal ways of life. Royal North-West
(later Canadian) Mounted Police officers enforced Canadian law upon even those
Aboriginal peoples who had previously operated at some remove from the colonial
government. Among the most destructive laws were those forbidding traditional
cultural practices, such as the Potlatch or Sun Dance, and those that required
Aboriginal children to attend residential schools.16
Residential schooling was an important part of a broader policy of assimilation.
Frustrated by Aboriginal peoples’ refusal to accept Canadian offers of ‘‘enfranch-
isement,’’ Canadian leaders turned to education as a means to eliminate Aboriginal
cultures. Residential schools began operating in the late nineteenth century, drawing
on an existing network of Protestant and Catholic schools. These were initially day
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schools, but their administrators felt that the children’s returning to their parents at
the end of each day was undoing their day of lessons in the proper conduct of ‘‘civilized’’
persons. In response, the schools began to hold students in residence for most of the
year, giving them only a month in the summer to visit their families. By 1920,
residential schools were made mandatory for all Aboriginal children. At many schools,
conditions were so inadequate that large numbers of children died from ill health,
exposure to the elements, and poor nutrition.17 Others suffered physical and sexual
abuse, as well as a constant verbal assault on their cultures, traditions, communities,
and families. Upon completing their education, many no longer felt at home or
welcome in their communities and became divorced from their cultural traditions.
Moreover, deprived of the experience of being parented, they later found it a great
struggle to raise their own children.18 Continuing cycles of emotional, physical, and
sexual abuse, as well as addiction, suicide, and other markers of intergenerational
trauma, within Aboriginal communities are considered residual effects of the
residential-school experience.19
The combined effects of land appropriation, violated or ignored treaties, legal
domination, and forced assimilation were devastating for Aboriginal peoples. However,
they did not entirely succumb to these experiences. Since colonization they have
enacted resistance both on an everyday and at a broader societal level. On the
everyday level, Aboriginal peoples have held onto their identities and have worked
hard to recover and revitalize Aboriginal languages and traditions in order to preserve
their cultures. Although these emblems of cultural identity are still in jeopardy, the
extent to which they have survived is remarkable, given the colonial onslaught against
them.20 On a broader societal level, Aboriginal persons have used national political
organizations such as the Assembly of First Nations and countless regional bodies to
express Aboriginal grievances and to pursue justice. The efforts of such organizations
have culminated in several moral and political victories. For example, in 1969, the
Canadian government tabled a white paper through which it attempted to impose the
individual rights of Canadian citizenship upon Aboriginal persons. This policy
decision, taken by Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government, seemed so contrary
to advice provided by First Nations leaders in government consultations prior to the
release of the document that it immediately galvanized Aboriginal persons across
Canada. Most saw this policy as an attempt at cultural assimilation that would destroy
the Aboriginal way of life. Because of their vocal and concerted protest, the Trudeau
government was forced to withdraw the proposal.
Aboriginal peoples have also used Canadian courts to protect and extend their
Aboriginal rights and title. One of the first major legal victories for Aboriginal peoples
came in Calder v. British Columbia (1973).21 Although the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision did not technically favor the Nisga’a First Nation, which launched the case,
the reasons for the judgment given by the Court did recognize that Aboriginal title is
not something granted by the Crown but, rather, pre-exists European settlement.
This decision, together with Aboriginal protests against the 1969 white paper,
convinced the Canadian government to take steps to acknowledge Aboriginal
demands. In this spirit, in 1974 the government began to negotiate comprehensive
land claims with Aboriginal groups that did not possess treaties, and affirmed and
recognized Aboriginal and treaty rights in Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982.22
Aboriginal peoples remain a powerful force within Canadian society, despite living
in conditions that set them apart in terms of poverty, health, economic opportunity,
education, and other indicators of social marginalization.
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Genocide and Canadian Aboriginal Peoples
The complexity of this historical narrative, even in such a simplified form, makes any
application of the concept of genocide to the circumstances difficult. First, the events
described above are loosely networked and do not follow any straightforward genocidal
teleology of intent; that is, although we see many moments of intentional destruction,
it would be difficult to legally prove the existence of a focused plan of annihilation that
could be construed as specific intent. Second, assaults on Aboriginal peoples often
derived from what were, at least at the time, liberal or even humanistic motivations.
Various ‘‘enlightened’’ Europeans came to North America with the belief that ‘‘Indians’’
could—through instruction and education—be made fit for ‘‘civilized’’ society. Finally,
given the constant presence of Aboriginal resistance, there is a tendency in Canadian
historiography to avoid use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ lest it portray Aboriginal nations as
utterly powerless in the face of European might and overlook their impressive
perseverance.23
These issues must be acknowledged in addressing Canadian Aboriginal claims of
genocide. However, they also distract us somewhat from grappling directly with
Aboriginal experiences of attempted colonial destruction. The first two issues prioritize
the intentions and motives of the perpetrators, but we must first address what
we mean by ‘‘destruction’’ before we can examine whether or not it was intended.
As I suggest below, Aboriginal peoples who suffered greatly at the hands of the
majority continue, in their own eyes, to suffer the effects of colonialism. Humanitarian
motives do not absolve genocidal intent if these humanitarian beliefs promoted the
denial and elimination of Aboriginal ways of being. The third issue attempts to shift
the focus away from portraying Aboriginal peoples as passive victims and toward
an emphasis on their active survival; however, it is wrong to assume that charges of
genocide presuppose the passivity of victims. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find
any instance of genocide that did not meet with some level of resistance on the part of
victims.
The remainder of this article is devoted to re-reading the opening sentence of art.
2 of the UNCG in a manner informed by Canadian Aboriginal experiences of
colonialism. The objective is to illustrate how we must first open our evaluative tools
to localized Aboriginal understandings of group identity and collective destruction
before we can attempt to adjudicate whether or not genocidal intent was evident in the
Canadian case.
Genocide and the UNCG
Raphael Lemkin devised the term ‘‘genocide,’’ a combination of Greek genos (‘‘race,’’
‘‘tribe’’) and Latin cide (from cidere, ‘‘to kill’’), to provoke the world to take seriously
this crime that had heretofore gone ‘‘without a name.’’24 With this new word in hand,
he directed his efforts toward the legal codification of the term so that a clear standard
would be in place, rather than the hodgepodge of international treaties and
agreements that did not speak to the scale of genocidal crimes. Debate continues
about what Lemkin determined to be included within, or necessary to, his definition of
genocide.
Lemkin, with his focus on the maintenance and protection of ‘‘national groups,’’
discussed not only mass killing and the physical elimination of such groups but also
what is often referred to as ‘‘cultural genocide’’ or ‘‘ethnocide.’’25 Some, such as Ward
Churchill, argue that, according to Lemkin, the destruction of a group’s ability
to continue its cultural existence is sufficient for a determination of genocide.26
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Others argue that Lemkin still held killing to be an essential component of genocide.27
Regardless, it is important to note that Lemkin did give priority to the protection of
cultural or ‘‘national’’ groups.28 Thus, ‘‘physical’’ genocide was not, for him, simply a
matter of individual killings in the aggregate; rather, it referred to the manner in
which the mass loss of life debilitates the continuation of a ‘‘group.’’ Given this, it must
also be acknowledged that extermination is not the only means available to achieve
group destruction, although it is certainly a potent and primary means.
Moreover, we must first learn something about the group’s singularity, or what
Lemkin calls the ‘‘essential foundations’’ of group life,29 if we are to ascertain what it
might mean to destroy them. What binds the group together? What cultural
components are central to the definitional work of reproducing this group as a social
unit? Obviously, there must be individual members participating in this collectivity if
it is to exist, but there may be other necessary factors involved as well: territory,
language, modes of governance, to name but a few. Based on this focus on the key
components of group life, the analytical difference that scholars such as Chalk and
Jonassohn claim to exist between physical and cultural forms of genocide becomes less
obvious, as we can envision the possibility that the loss of the so-called cultural
components of group life might be as damaging to the group’s sustainability as the
killing of its members.30 Thus, these processes of physical and cultural destruction are
so entwined that they are often separable only at an analytical level that breaks down
upon examination of actual experiences of destruction.31
Lemkin’s goal of achieving recognition of the crime of genocide was realized,
in part, with the drafting of UNCG. Article 2 of this convention reads,
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.32
Setting aside for the moment the five means to genocide that follow the ‘‘as such,’’
as well as the political context in which this article was crafted,33 it is worth exploring
the opening sentence of art. 2 in relation to Canadian Aboriginal experiences of
destruction. It is this statement that establishes the parameters of the UNCG,
demanding that we consider the meanings of words such as ‘‘intent,’’ ‘‘destroy,’’ and
‘‘group.’’
Aboriginal Understandings of Group Identity
One of the most controversial aspects of the UNCG is that it restricts the groups
potentially targeted by genocide to ‘‘national, ethnical, racial or religious’’ groups.
Clearly, this is a rather limited list of potential groupings that ignores a great variety
of forms of collective life.34 Nonetheless, it could be argued that Aboriginal groups fit
into one or more of these group categories. For example, Aboriginal groups have some
of the characteristics of racial or ethnic groups, in the sense that they exhibit distinct
cultural practices and are bound by specific norms, beliefs, and a common language or
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linguistic heritage. However, this designation overlooks the multiethnic dimensions of
Canadian Aboriginal communities. Often these communities invite members from
other communities to join their ranks; indeed, such ethnic mobility was historically
encouraged as a means of creating inter-tribal links.35 For this reason, one might
be tempted, instead, to designate Canadian Aboriginal communities as ‘‘nations’’ for
purposes of the UNCG. However, this too is imperfect, since, unlike European notions
of nationhood that presuppose fixed national boundaries, Aboriginal understandings of
territory tend to be more fluid. For example, neighboring Aboriginal groups often held
‘‘shared territories’’ that allowed for multi-community usage of lands.36
Thus, the restrictions placed on group identity by the UNCG are inappropriate and
potentially encourage a ‘‘totalization’’ of community life that is itself a danger to
Aboriginal group identities. In other words, by seeking to impose clear community
parameters upon Canadian Aboriginal groups, interpreters of the UNCG may
miscategorize these communities in a way that obstructs their attempts to exist as
‘‘becoming communities’’37—that is, communities engaged in an ongoing and daily
process of self-definition and redefinition that never suggests a point of community
closure. Indeed, some Aboriginal peoples consider the experience of enforced closure,
through mechanisms such as the Canadian reserve system and the ‘‘self-governance’’
arrangements offered by the Canadian government, part of an ongoing process
of attempted colonial destruction.38
The UNCG further implies that a group consists solely of its human members, but
this may be quite contrary to the group identity of collectivities adhering to or built
upon animist belief systems that include their environs and local wildlife as part of the
group. Under the terms of the UNCG, the impact of the destruction or expropriation
of lands and wildlife on group life is considered only through the charge (in art. 2(c))
of ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part.’’ Indeed, several scholars have used this
part of the UNCG to argue that the ecological destruction experienced by Canadian
Aboriginal peoples is genocidal.39 Along these lines, one could examine how, at the
end of the fur-trade period, with the move toward settlement, the colonial project
began to bear more directly on Aboriginal lands. For example, in British Columbia,
the imposition of the reserve system denied Aboriginal peoples nearly all of
their territories, as well as traditional hunting, fishing, and governance practices.
As Cole Harris notes,
From the late 1860s, Native leaders had protested their small reserves in every
way they could, claiming, fundamentally, that their people would not have enough food
and that their progeny had no prospects. In retrospect, they were right. The spaces
assigned to Native people did not support them, although the mixed economies they
cobbled together, the revised diets they ate, and the accommodations and settlements
they lived in had allowed some of them to survive.40
This destructive force of colonial land appropriation is evident in the experiences of
the Tsawwassen First Nation. Located in the lower mainland of British Columbia,
their reserve was wedged between a ferry terminal, a coal port, and a highway.
The coal port and the ferry terminal combined to destroy shellfish life and fishing areas
along the Tsawwassen beachfront, and their longhouse was destroyed to make way for
the highway. Such practices, and their equivalents throughout BC and across
Canada,41 were near catastrophic in their consequences, especially when combined
with the population loss caused by European diseases, making difficult not only
cultural but also physical reproduction. Thus, one could reasonably argue that these
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are instances in which ‘‘conditions of life calculated to bring about [an Aboriginal
group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part’’ were inflicted.
However, this reading does not fully address the centrality of land and wildlife to
Aboriginal peoples. As Peter Kulchyski suggests of Aboriginal communities in
Denendeh and Nunavut, the Aboriginal relationship to landscape is neither merely
‘‘closeness’’ to nor a strong reliance upon nature; rather, the natural world represents
an ‘‘embodied inscription.’’42 Territory is an essential part of their group-formation
processes, and its removal represents a dire threat to the ability of these groups to
reproduce a group identity. Mohawk legal scholar Patricia Monture-Angus describes
group identity as follows: ‘‘Identity, as I have come to understand it, requires a
relationship with territory (and not a relationship based on control of that territory).’’43
The point is that it is a disservice to force Aboriginal experiences of ecological
destruction into a framework that acknowledges only the subsistence value of land to a
group, even if this move might initially appear to advance their justice claims by
clearly locating land and wildlife destruction within the terms of the UNCG. To fully
acknowledge the Aboriginal experience of attempted destruction, we need to under-
stand land and environment not simply as means of sustaining group life, but as key
components of group life. Thus, in our example, the Tsawwassen did not simply lose
their traditional food supports and their longhouse; the whittling down of their reserve
and the destruction of their sociocultural environment placed severe restrictions on
how they could imagine themselves as a people in relation to, and as part of, their
physical surroundings.
Similarly, Westphalian notions of ‘‘national’’ territory as bounded property to be
owned and used for profit often conflict with traditional Aboriginal understandings of
territory.44 For the Coast Salish of British Columbia, territories are not sharply
defined and instead allow for greater freedom of movement, sharing, and relationships.
Indeed, the imposition of boundaries upon these communities presents a significant
challenge to their self-understandings and group identity. As Brian Thom states,
Coast Salish members
see boundaries and borders as arbitrary and artificial at best, and at worst a part of a
recurring colonial mechanism of government to create division between communities
and kin and weaken the potential strength of the Coast Salish people as a Nation.
These people are concerned that the power of such maps and terms will have the effect
of severing their connections to place, framing the future of engagements with the land
exercised as rights negotiated under land claims settlements firmly in western
ontological terms.45
Genocide scholars interested in the attempted destruction of Canadian Aboriginal
peoples should thus be wary of trying to categorize and draw boundaries around these
peoples in a manner that imposes Western understandings of group identity and group
spaces. If its categories are not held sufficiently open to Canadian Aboriginal notions of
identity and space, the UNCG may unwittingly become yet another Eurocentric tool
for reframing Aboriginal lifeworlds, rather than a resource for Aboriginal justice.46
Forms of Destruction
So what does it mean to ‘‘destroy’’ a group? The previous section discussed the
destructive effects of the imposition of European notions of group identity and
territory; in this section I focus instead on how a modernist framing of destruction
potentially leads to the exclusion of certain harms from consideration in our discussion
of genocide.
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Genocide carries with it notions of harm that are artifacts of a specific
(in particular, modernist) viewpoint that may not reflect how harms are experienced
and understood by different collectives. This is particularly true of what are argued to
be ‘‘natural’’ processes of destruction, such as disease and famine. As Bruno Latour
notes, the modern ‘‘Constitution’’ holds the poles of nature and culture separate, all the
while allowing for the proliferation of hybrids, or ‘‘quasi-objects’’ and ‘‘quasi-subjects,’’
that are amalgamations of nature and culture networked together in a complex
interface. This act of ‘‘purification’’—that is, of keeping nature and culture separate—
allows moderns to stack the deck in their favor, designating events and objects to
either the nature or the culture pole when it suits their interests.47 Taking Latour’s
argument out of its science studies context, we can examine how this practice of
purification operates within debates about what is and what is not genocide, as the
hybridity of destructive processes—for example, the deadly spread of HIV/AIDS
through rapes, or the destruction caused by (fully or partially) orchestrated famines
designed to punish rebellious collectives—often complicates the picture of what is and
is not a part of a genocidal action.
We are able to separate hybridic and networked phenomena such as disease and
famine into the category of ‘‘nature’’ (as distinct from culture or society) not because
this is what empirical evidence suggests but because we adhere to an intellectual
orientation that holds nature and culture to be mutually distinct and uncoupled,
despite their clear interconnections.48 Moreover, this separation also allows for the
production of more terrible hybrids whose destructive tendencies are not held to
account by law or ethics because they are not viewed as targets for social intervention.
Thus, European diseases were permitted to ravage Aboriginal communities largely
unchecked, and with a certain degree of indifference, because these were not processes
for which Europeans felt particularly responsible.49
The spread of European diseases served to weaken Aboriginal communities and to
increase European dominance in North America. As traders and missionaries
penetrated further into Aboriginal societies, they carried epidemics such as smallpox
with them. In other cases, the diseases spread through Aboriginal networks,
originating at colonial entry points—the forts and ports of North America—and
eventually reaching even those groups who had yet to experience European contact.
In these latter cases, the diseases acted as a pre-emptive form of ethnic cleansing,
allowing Europeans to declare Aboriginal lands terra nullius upon reaching the latter’s
decimated communities.50
Amidst the first epidemics of the mid- to late seventeenth century, the growing
importance of trade for Aboriginal societies limited their ability to respond to the
simultaneously growing threat of disease. For example, the Huron in southwestern
Ontario suspected that the plagues that were destroying their communities were
brought by the French Jesuit missionaries, but they dared not evict the missionaries
for fear that the French would halt trade with the Huron. Subsequently, with the
Huron weakened by disease and the supply of beaver pelts dwindling to the point of
provoking greater inter-tribal friction over trade competition, the Iroquois confederacy
attacked and destroyed the Huron.51
Tuberculosis was rampant through many residential schools until the 1940s, and
reports suggest that the staff at these schools did little to help the infected children.
Susceptibility to this and other diseases was increased by the poor nutrition and
inadequate clothing provided to students. In addition, there are reports of students’
being required to bunk with others who were infected.52 With death tolls from
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tuberculosis reaching as high as 50% in some schools, any claim that this was simply
‘‘natural’’ is exposed as disingenuous at best.
More recently, the community of Grassy Narrows experienced the destructive
effects of forced modernization, environmental deterioration, and assimilation.
Relocated from their more isolated reserve by the Canadian government because it
was believed the First Nation would be better served if they had access to a direct
roadway to Kenora, Ontario, the community suffered in the end through the loss of its
traditions, mass suicide, rampant child neglect and abuse, widespread alcoholism and
mercury poisoning, and the destruction of their food source and livelihood.53
Each of these destructive events represents a braiding of social and natural
processes.54 However, the UNCG is often read within a modernist framework that
assumes a stark divide between nature and culture. Thus, the five forms of destruction
highlighted in art. 2—‘‘killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group’’—all presume a decidedly social strategy of elimination.
The problem with this presumption, in terms of understanding the attempted
destruction of Canadian Aboriginal peoples, is that it allows the colonizer to avoid
responsibility for hybridic assaults on Aboriginal peoples. Disease is conveniently
removed as relevant evidence because it is classified as a natural process. But diseases
such as smallpox and tuberculosis, and industrial ailments such as mercury poisoning,
were experienced by Aboriginal peoples as consequences of enforced contact with
non-Aboriginal peoples, and as part of a structured set of destructive relations, that
cannot simply be categorized as ‘‘natural.’’ If we are to contend adequately with these
experiences, we must not exclude certain forms of destruction from consideration;
instead, genocide scholars must be ready to interrogate the modernist oppositions that
shape our ways of knowing and being in the world.
Understanding Intent
One of the most vexing issues in discussions about genocide in Canada is that of intent.
As in debates about genocide in other settler societies (the United States, Australia,
and New Zealand), questions are raised about whether the perpetrators clearly
formulated an intent to eliminate Aboriginal peoples. Some argue that because the
Canadian colonial government’s assimilation policies were based on humanitarian
and welfare-oriented concerns, they cannot be considered genocidal, since they do
not evince a clear malevolent intent. Others point to the fact that functionaries
and settlers operating at a distance from government were often the key agents of
Aboriginal destruction. Missionaries, gold miners, settlers, and others carried with
them no government mandate to impinge upon Aboriginal lifeworlds. However,
Lemkin’s work on Aboriginal genocides suggests that centrally coordinated planning is
not required for an event to be categorized as genocide. Indeed, Lemkin’s work shows
great awareness of the networked character of Aboriginal destruction, acknowledging
that various ‘‘genocidists’’ possessing different motives might each play a role in the
wider process of Aboriginal destruction.55
My objective in this section, however, is neither to outline debates about colonial
intent nor to offer an alternative notion of intent. Rather, I aim to demonstrate,
through the example of Canadian residential schools, how the notion of intent hinges
on our understandings of group identity and group destruction.56 In other words,
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unless we take Aboriginal notions of group identity and group destruction seriously,
we will have difficulty pinpointing ‘‘intent.’’
Death was not an uncommon event in Canada’s residential schools. More than half
the students at certain schools succumbed to early death from unchecked disease, poor
nutrition, or lack of proper clothing and shelter.57 Add to these the deaths brought on
through physical and sexual assaults, and the suicides that sometimes followed these
attacks, and one gains a sense of the deadly nature of this ‘‘civilizing’’ project. The
point has been made that it was the ‘‘progressives’’ of their time who sought to redeem
Aboriginal peoples by incorporating them into colonial society.58 For this reason,
charges of presentism are often leveled against those who are insensitive to the ethical
milieu in which government and residential-school workers operated. Indeed, in
the words of Reverend Wilson of the Shingwauk, residential schools appear benign on
the surface:
[The Indian child] must be taught many things which come to the white child without
the schoolmaster’s aid. From the days of its birth, the child of civilized parents is
constantly in contact with the modes of civilized life, of action, thought, speech and
dress; and is surrounded by a thousand beneficent influences. . . . He [the Indian child]
must be led out from the conditions of . . . birth, in his early years, into the environment
of civilized domestic life; and he must be thus led by his teacher.59
The intention to breach the bond between parent and child and to disconnect the
Aboriginal child from his or her collective receives much more blatant treatment in the
words of Duncan Campbell Scott, superintendent of Indian Affairs from 1913 to 1932:
‘‘I want to get rid of the Indian problem. Our object is to continue until there is not a
single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed. They are a weird and waning
race.’’60 Those seeking a teleology of intent would likely identify the latter statement as
a point of origin in the Canadian genocidal process, but we must not fall into this
trap; instead we should seek to understand the networked destruction wrought by
residential schools in Canada as they destroyed not just lives but generations of lives
by disrupting cultural patterns of parenting and cultural transmission. In this sense,
they reflect an all-out assault on Aboriginal ontologies. As John Milloy points out,
The child, parent, and community exist in a landscape—a culture’s translation of
environment into a ‘‘meaning’’-filled place. Parts of the programme of studies would
disorient children and then attempt to re-orient them in a place filled with European
‘‘meaning.’’ This ‘‘programme’’ intersected with other parts of the Canadian colonial
enterprise to drastically alter the path of Aboriginal cultural production and
reproduction.61
Thus, even though we have what may be taken as a clear statement of intent
issued by a prominent government official, an overreliance on this statement distracts
us from what is really at stake here: a colonial project that refused, and continues
to refuse, to recognize the legitimacy of Aboriginal lifeworlds. Canadian colonialism
has sought—through a range of seemingly benign and overtly aggressive actions—to
replace these lifeworlds with the cultural patterns of the colonizers.62 As Robert van
Krieken states with respect to the experiences of the ‘‘stolen generations’’ of Australian
Aboriginal peoples, the source of destruction may lie less in an ‘‘unambiguous ‘intent to
destroy’ a human group, than in the presumption that there was not much to
destroy.’’63 Thus, to better understand the Aboriginal experience of destruction, we
must move beyond a legalistic notion of intent that seeks to identify specific
calculations of destruction on the part of the perpetrator; instead, we must understand
intent as a catastrophic form of misrecognition, which so devalues a population that
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assimilation is assumed to be a matter of their general welfare. In many ways,
Europeans imagined Aboriginal peoples to be destitute, backward, uncivilized, and
savage, and these assumptions facilitated their choice to impose a ‘‘liberal humanism’’
that denied Aboriginal ontologies.
Conclusion
The argument that Canadian Aboriginal peoples have experienced genocide is not
new.64 However, the authors who make this argument tend to take a universalist and
modernist interpretation of genocide as their premise and to fit their claims of genocide
within its frame, thereby reinforcing its hegemony. In contrast, my objective here has
not been to prove a Canadian Aboriginal genocide against the UNCG standard or any
other; instead, I have attempted to (a) establish that the designation of ‘‘cultural
genocide’’ is too qualified and imprecise for understanding Canadian Aboriginal
experiences of colonialism, and (b) argue that re-reading and opening certain
components of the UNCG through an engagement with Canadian Aboriginal
experiences and understandings of group identity, destruction, and intent provides a
clearer path to discerning the nature of genocide in Canada.
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